Labor Antitrust’s Paradox
Hiba Hafiz†
Growing inequality, the decline in labor’s share of national income, and increasing evidence of labor-market concentration and employer buyer power are all
subjects of national attention, eliciting wide-ranging proposals for legal reform.
Many proposals hinge on labor-market fixes and empowering workers within and
beyond existing work law or through tax-and-transfer schemes. But a recent surge
of interest focuses on applying antitrust law in labor markets, or “labor antitrust.”
These proposals call for more aggressive enforcement by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as well as stronger legal remedies for
employer collusion and unlawful monopsony that suppresses workers’ wages.
The turn to labor antitrust is driven in part by congressional gridlock and the
collapse of labor law as a dominant source of labor market regulation, inviting regulation through other means. Labor antitrust promises an effective attack because
agency discretion and judicial enforcement can police labor markets without substantial amendments to existing law, bypassing the current impasse in Congress.
Further, unlike labor and employment law, labor antitrust is uniquely positioned to
challenge industry-wide wage suppression: suing multiple employers is increasingly
challenging in work law as a statutory, doctrinal, and procedural matter.
But current labor-antitrust proposals, while fruitful, are fundamentally limited in two ways. First, echoing a broader antitrust policy crisis, they inherit and
reinvigorate debates about the current consumer welfare goal of antitrust. The proposals ignore that, as a theoretical and practical matter, employers’ anticompetitive
conduct in labor markets does not necessarily harm consumers. As a result, workers’
labor-antitrust challenges will face an uphill battle under current law: when consumers are not harmed, labor antitrust can neither effectively police employer buyer
power nor fill gaps in labor market regulation left by a retreating labor law. Second,
the proposals ignore real synergies between antitrust enforcement and labor regulation that could preempt the rise of employer buyer power and contain its exercise.
This Essay analyzes the limitations of current labor-antitrust proposals and
argues for “regulatory sharing” between antitrust and labor law to combat the adverse effects of employer buyer power. It makes three key contributions. First, it
frames the new labor antitrust as disrupting a grand regulatory bargain, reinforced
by the Chicago School, that separated labor and antitrust regulation to resolve a
perceived paradox in serving two masters: workers and consumers. The dominance
of the consumer welfare standard resolved that paradox. Second, it explains how
scholarly attempts to invigorate labor antitrust fail to overcome this paradox and
ignore theoretical and doctrinal roadblocks to maximizing both worker and consumer welfare, leaving worker-plaintiffs vulnerable to failure. Third, it proposes a
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novel restructuring of labor market regulation that integrates antitrust and labor
law enforcement to achieve coherent and effective regulation of employer buyer
power. It refocuses labor-antitrust claims on consumer welfare ends. In doing so, it
also relegates worker welfare considerations to a labor law supplemented and fortified by the creation of substantive presumptions and defenses triggered by laborantitrust findings as well as labor agency involvement in merger review.

INTRODUCTION
Growing inequality, the decline in labor’s share of national
income, and increasing evidence of labor-market concentration
and employer buyer power are all subjects of national attention,
eliciting wide-ranging proposals for legal reform. Many proposals
hinge on either labor market fixes, empowering workers within
and beyond existing work law, or tax-and-transfer schemes.1 But
a recent surge of interest focuses on applying antitrust law in labor markets, or “labor antitrust.” These proposals call for more
aggressive enforcement by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as well as stronger legal remedies for employer collusion and unlawful monopsony that suppresses workers’ wages.2
The turn to labor antitrust is driven in part by congressional
gridlock and the collapse of labor law as a dominant source of labor market regulation, inviting regulation through other means.
Labor antitrust promises an effective attack because agency discretion and judicial enforcement can police labor markets without
substantial amendments to existing law, bypassing the current
impasse in Congress. Further, unlike labor and employment law,
labor antitrust is uniquely positioned to challenge industry-wide

1
See generally, for example, Joseph R. Fishkin and William E. Forbath, The AntiOligarchy Constitution (forthcoming Harvard 2020) (on file with author) (urging a constitutional critique of inequitable wealth concentration); Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law,
126 Yale L J 2 (2016). For tax policy discussions, see, for example, Eric A. Posner and E.
Glen Weyl, Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society 205–
49 (Princeton 2018); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 471–570 (Harvard
2014) (Arthur Goldhammer, trans); Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy Implications, 35 Contemp Econ Pol 7, 18–24 (2017).
2
See, for example, Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets, 94 Ind L J 1031, 1048–63 (2019) (explaining how courts should
evaluate challenges to labor monopsonies under the Clayton Act); Suresh Naidu and Eric
A. Posner, Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law *7–26 (working paper, Jan 13,
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/52RQ-LK45; Ioana Marinescu and Eric A. Posner, Why
Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers? *31–40 (working paper, Mar 10, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/GD3B-XJLD; Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, and Glen Weyl, Antitrust
Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 Harv L Rev 536, 574–99 (2018).
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wage suppression; suing multiple employers is increasingly challenging in work law as a statutory, doctrinal, and procedural matter.
But current labor-antitrust proposals, while fruitful, are fundamentally limited in two ways. First, echoing a broader antitrust policy crisis, they inherit and reinvigorate debates about the
current consumer welfare goal of antitrust. The proposals ignore
that, as a theoretical and practical matter, employers’ anticompetitive conduct in labor markets does not necessarily harm consumers. As a result, workers’ labor-antitrust challenges will face
an uphill battle under current law: when consumers are not
harmed, labor antitrust can neither effectively police employer
buyer power nor fill gaps in labor market regulation left by a retreating labor law. Second, the proposals ignore real synergies between antitrust enforcement and labor regulation that could
preempt the rise of employer buyer power and contain its exercise.
This Essay analyzes the limitations of current labor-antitrust
proposals and argues for regulatory sharing between antitrust
and labor law to combat the adverse effects of employer buyer
power. It makes three key contributions. First, it frames the new
labor antitrust as disrupting a grand regulatory bargain, reinforced by the Chicago School, that separated labor and antitrust
regulation to resolve a perceived paradox in serving two masters:
workers and consumers. The dominance of the consumer welfare
standard resolved that paradox. Second, it explains how scholarly
attempts to invigorate labor antitrust fail to overcome this paradox and ignore theoretical and doctrinal roadblocks to maximizing both worker and consumer welfare, leaving worker-plaintiffs
vulnerable to failure. Third, it proposes a novel restructuring of
labor market regulation that integrates antitrust and labor law
enforcement to achieve coherent and effective regulation of employer buyer power. It refocuses labor-antitrust claims on consumer welfare ends and relegates worker welfare considerations
to a labor law supplemented and fortified by the creation of substantive presumptions and defenses triggered by labor-antitrust
findings as well as labor agency involvement in merger review.
I. THE RISE OF LABOR ANTITRUST’S PARADOX
A. Identifying the Paradox: Chicago School Approaches
As has been well documented, the Chicago School elevated
economic analysis and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust
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policy and doctrine.3 But it also established a strict separation between labor and product market regulation, focusing exclusively
on worker combinations’ anticompetitive effects on consumer
prices.4 Judge Robert Bork explicitly relegated decisions on how
to value collectively bargained wage premiums over maximizing
consumer welfare to congressional policy: “We . . . reserve the
choice for legislative determination and require the terms of the
treaty—between . . . laborers and consumers . . .—to be written
down, with the resultant . . . value trade-offs specified in . . . labormanagement relations laws.”5 The legislative mandate “encourag[ing] [ ] labor union formation to enhance the gains of some
workers at the expense of consumers” meant that labor-antitrust
regulation exceeded the judicial role:
For some time . . . the federal courts, not perceiving the
basic incongruity of the attempt, did try to govern labor-management relations through the Sherman Act. The incongruity
lay in the attempt to permit labor unions as cartels fixing the
price of labor but to regulate their behavior. This was identical with a decision to permit cartelization but to require that
the cartel charge only “reasonable” prices, a course the Court
refused to take in nonlabor cases. The result . . . was an incoherent body of law. . . .
Courts are the wrong institution for these unstructured
interpersonal comparisons both because political choices of
this nature should . . . be made by elected and representative
institutions, and because the courts do not have the facilities
for fact-finding on a broad scale that are available to the legislature. The admission by a court of goals in conflict with
consumer welfare into the adjudicative process, therefore, involves a serious usurpation of the legislative function.6
Bork’s core concerns were administrability and avoiding “rate
regulation” to ensure “reasonable” wages; such could not be the

3
See, for example, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and Antitrust Law, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol 449, 450–52 (2008); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 925, 928 (1979) (discussing the role of price
theory in the Chicago School).
4
See generally, for example, Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38
Stan L Rev 991 (1986); Douglas L. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 Va L Rev 1183
(1980); Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U Chi L Rev 988 (1984).
5
Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 80 (Basic
Books 1978).
6
Id at 83 (emphasis added).
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antitrust court’s task.7 Bork likewise relegated distributional decisions to the political branches because these decisions “require[ ] a choice between two groups of consumers that should be
made by the legislature.”8
Thus, traditional Chicago School accounts were skeptical of
labor-antitrust enforcement, arguing that “[t]he effect of a labormarket restraint on price and output may be as great as that of a
business-market restraint; however, the legislative choice to
sanction some union acts but not others seems to rest on considerations beyond those of competition and efficiency.”9 They concentrated instead on labor market restraints that were “part of a
scheme to regulate the product market by controlling prices, outputs, or market allocations.”10
As a result of these developments, and of the Chicago School’s
intellectual dominance in modern antitrust, employer monopsony
and collusion were, at best, underenforced and underdiscussed.
The DOJ and FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines from 1968
through 1997 made no reference to mergers that enhance buyside market power, and when the 2010 Guidelines introduced
buy-side effects, there was no mention of whether or how to assess
such effects in labor markets.11
B. Regulatory Détente: Antitrust’s Labor Exemption
The Chicago School’s identification of labor antitrust’s paradox echoed a long-standing regulatory détente that placed worker
combinations and vertical employer-employee restraints under a
separate regime from antitrust law: labor law. Workers partially
won antitrust immunity under the Clayton12 and NorrisLaGuardia13 Acts’ “statutory” exemption, which protected union
conduct during a labor dispute as long as that conduct was peaceful, in the union’s own interest, and not combined with nonlabor
groups.14
7

See id at 79–88.
Id at 111.
9
Leslie, 66 Va L Rev at 1184 (cited in note 4). See also Campbell, 38 Stan L Rev at
992–94 (cited in note 4); Posner, 51 U Chi L Rev at 989–90 (cited in note 4).
10 Leslie, 66 Va L Rev at 1185 (cited in note 4).
11 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 12 (Aug 19, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/E4WS-NMAG; Naidu, Posner,
and Weyl, 132 Harv L Rev at 540 (cited in note 2). See also note 82.
12 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified as amended in various sections of Title 15 and Title 29.
13 Pub L No 72-65, 47 Stat 70 (1932), codified as amended at 29 USC § 101 et seq.
14 15 USC § 17; 29 USC §§ 52, 101, 104, 113.
8
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The exemption was motivated by the view that labor was not
a “commodity” whose price should be set by market forces alone.15
The bifurcation of labor from antitrust regulation was a means of
targeting corporate combinations to ensure interfirm competition
while protecting worker combinations from wage-setting through
“prodigal and damaging” competition.16 For the 1914 Congress,
the exemption rejected “the point of view of some economists” that
labor, “like potatoes, or steel . . . is offered by the owner in the
highest market and sought by the buyer in the lowest market.”17
It was justified under classical political economy, matured
through nineteenth-century American labor republicanism, to
protect workers’ liberty and achieve “a higher and just price for
. . . labor.”18 Congressional debates on the Norris-LaGuardia Act
reiterated this view:
The constantly increasing combinations of wealth have [ ]
built up court-made law which has placed the laborer at the
mercy of capital, has denied to him a fair wage and a fair
opportunity for freedom of contract. Shall combinations of
wealth enslave the workingmen, or shall Congress give the
laboring men the right to use their collective strength against
the combination of wealth?19
The 1935 enactment of the National Labor Relations Act20
(NLRA) created a regulatory home for worker combinations. It
was the first legislation to explicitly introduce the problem of employer buyer power into labor-market regulation, and its purpose
was to prevent the “inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership” from “depressing wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage earners.”21 The NLRA justified
worker combinations as a countervailing power that, in the words

15

See 15 USC § 17.
75 Cong Rec 5425, 5513 (1932) (statement of Rep White).
17 51 Cong Rec 14585, 14608 (1914) (statement of Sen Kern).
18 Id at 14587 (statement of Sen Lewis) (emphasis added). For the history of “free
labor,” “the justice price,” and labor republicanism, see Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to
the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century
82–86 (Cambridge 2015); William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of
Economic Regulation in America, 35 Yale J Reg 721, 733–36 (2018).
19 75 Cong Rec at 5487 (statement of Rep Sparks) (cited in note 16).
20 Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 449, codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq.
21 29 USC § 151.
16
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of its sponsor, Senator Robert Wagner, “match[ed] the huge aggregates of modern capital.”22 But workers’ protected “cartel” activity was presumptively limited to single-firm bargaining units,
and strike protections extended almost exclusively to strikes directed against that single-firm employer.23
This regulatory bargain was a precarious détente. The lines
between labor and antitrust regulation blurred with the imposition of antitrust liability on worker combinations for: (1) boycotting other firms that dealt with their employer during labor disputes; (2) joining with their employers to exclude employers’ nonunionized competitors in downstream markets; and (3) combining
as NLRA-exempt workers, like independent contractors.24 Worker
liability for the effects of their actions on product markets evolved
into a “nonstatutory” labor exemption, in which courts impose liability if they find the NLRA’s labor policy favoring collective bargaining is outweighed by antitrust policy favoring free competition in business markets.25 So if NLRA-protected workers act
alone—say, by striking—to compel their employer to agree to better wages, they are entitled to antitrust immunity.26 But if workers agree with a “nonlabor party [ ] to restrain competition in a
business market,”27 or compel employers “to impose a certain
wage scale on other bargaining units,”28 their behavior falls outside the exemption: courts have characterized such behavior as a
“restraint on the business market [that] has substantial anticompetitive effects . . . that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.”29
Antitrust liability was exclusively imposed on worker combinations; employers suffered no antitrust liability for employeremployer collusion, labor-market monopsony, or buyer power over
nonunionized or unprotected workers. The Supreme Court even
said, in Apex Hosiery Co v Leader,30 that “an elimination of price
22 Robert Wagner, The New Responsibilities of Organized Labor, NY State Federation of Labor Convention Address ¶ 5 (1928), reprinted in 70 Cong Rec 225, 227.
23 See 29 USC § 159(b); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc, 139 NLRB 629, 630–32 (1962); J&L
Plate, Inc, 310 NLRB 429, 429–30 (1993). Multi-employer bargaining units are rare.
24 See, for example, Connell Construction Co v Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No 100, 421 US 616, 621–23 (1975); Federal Trade Commission v Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association, 493 US 411, 422–23 (1990).
25 See Connell, 421 US at 622.
26 See, for example, United States v Hutcheson, 312 US 219, 233 (1941).
27 Connell, 421 US at 622–23.
28 United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381 US 657, 665 (1965).
29 Connell, 421 US at 625.
30 310 US 469 (1940).
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competition based on differences in labor standards” between employers “has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of
price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.”31 Some scholars interpret Apex Hosiery more broadly—as holding that “the
Sherman Act . . . would simply not apply to a certain class of restraints. Employers, or employers in combination with unions,
would presumably be as free as unions acting alone to halt competition grounded in wage differentials.”32
Commentary in the Warren Court era warned that strategic
application of the labor exemption would disrupt the détente,
wrongly committing “the federal judiciary to the formulation of
national labor policy by reaffirming the Sherman Act as an independent head of federal jurisdiction in labor disputes.”33 For example, in evaluating the Court’s application of the Sherman Act
to unions’ secondary boycotts—boycotts against nonemployers to
pressure direct employers or expand union density—Professor
Ralph Winter concluded that a “per se ban on secondary boycotts
[ ] cannot be based solely on a desire to maintain competition but
necessarily stems from a judicial judgment as to how much power
unions should have.”34 He argued that antitrust should stay out
of regulating labor markets—even when worker conduct has
product-market effects—to preserve collective bargaining as “a
system of private ordering” in which “radical tampering must be
at the price of restrictions on freedom and will necessarily have
unpredictable results.”35
C. Disrupting the Détente: The New Labor Antitrust
The recent focus of attention on the anticompetitive effects of
employer buyer power has prompted calls for aggressive laborantitrust enforcement and even incorporation of work-law violations into antitrust liability analysis against employers.36 Professors Eric Posner, Glen Weyl, Suresh Naidu, Herbert Hovenkamp,
Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum have theorized and
31

Id at 503–04.
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62
Va L Rev 603, 606 (1976) (emphasis added).
33 Ralph K. Winter Jr, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of
Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L J 14, 34 (1963) (emphasis added).
34 Id at 36.
35 Id at 68 (emphasis added).
36 See note 2; Ioana Marinescu and Eric A. Posner, A Proposal to Enhance Antitrust
Protection Against Labor Market Monopsony *13–16 (Roosevelt Institute Working Paper,
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/HJK5-A6D7.
32
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empirically analyzed the effects of employer market power on
worker pay, primarily to inform government merger enforcement
strategies (and, to a lesser extent, employer restraints and conduct under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).37 For the most
part, this scholarship prescribes how scrutinized conduct should
be deemed anticompetitive under traditional structural industrial organization (IO) models and methods, demonstrating their
administrability and easy integration into existing enforcement.38
Government and private enforcers have followed suit, challenging employer collusion on wages, no-poaching agreements,
and unlawful monopsonization while announcing incorporation of
labor market effects in merger review.39 The DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC have condemned and announced their intent to
criminally prosecute naked wage restraints and horizontal nopoaching agreements as per se unlawful.40 And the FTC has conducted hearings to investigate and publicize the problem of anticompetitive conduct in labor markets.41
But by not seriously contending with theoretical, doctrinal,
and factual reasons why worker and consumer welfare are not
always aligned, the new labor-antitrust scholarship revives labor
antitrust’s paradox. Many scholars claim their proposals are

37 See note 2; C. Scott Hemphill and Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127
Yale L J 2078, 2082–85 (2018). See generally Alan B. Krueger and Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Workers from Monopsony and Collusion (The Hamilton
Project, Feb 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YC7H-49YJ. For empirical work, see generally Jose A. Azar, et al, Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 24395, Feb 2019),
archived at https://perma.cc/4EQF-C6ZB; David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Simon
Mongey, Labor Market Power (Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper No 12276,
Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NWA8-4LZH; Arindrajit Dube, et al, Monopsony
in Online Labor Markets (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No 24416, Mar 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2E7T-L7D4.
38 See Naidu, Posner, and Weyl, 132 Harv L Rev at 539, 542, 584 (cited in note 2).
See also Marinescu and Hovenkamp, 94 Ind L J at 1034, 1044 (cited in note 2). See generally Adil Abdela and Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Impact of the Proposed Sprint–
T-Mobile Merger (Economic Policy Institute and Roosevelt Institute, Dec 2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/Q5UC-YZT6.
39 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at § 12 (cited in note 11).
40 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals *3 (Oct 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/DVQ6-LHA3.
41 See generally Federal Trade Commission, Hearing on Competition and Consumer
Protection in the 21st Century (Oct 15–17, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/MZ2Y-Z5Y5;
Federal Trade Commission, Hearing on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st
Century (Oct 16, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YK62-XR3K; Federal Trade Commission, Hearing on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (Oct 17, 2018),
archived at https://perma.cc/NGP4-YVN2.
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consistent with the consumer welfare standard because, they postulate, employer buyer power harms consumers: it results in reduced labor inputs, reduced labor inputs in turn reduce outputs
downstream, and output reduction results in higher prices and
deadweight loss that harms consumers.42 But theory, doctrine,
and the empirical realities of current labor markets undermine
this account. Other scholars reject the consumer welfare standard, proposing worker welfare, overall welfare, or broader “public
interest” or “effective competition” standards.43 Worker welfare
standard proponents argue that, in evaluating employers’ anticompetitive conduct, harm to workers should be sufficient to trigger antitrust liability.44 Aggregate welfare proponents would
weigh anticompetitive effects in labor markets against efficiencies created in product markets.45 Neo-Brandeisians propose an
“effective”46 or “protection of competition”47 standard. Under the
effective-competition standard, antitrust policy would protect individuals, consumers, workers, and others throughout the supply
chain, but would also focus on preserving opportunities for competitors, promoting individual autonomy and well-being, and

42 See, for example, Naidu, Posner, and Weyl, 132 Harv L Rev at 559 (cited in note 2);
Marinescu and Hovenkamp, 94 Ind L J at 1062–63 (cited in note 2); Gregory J. Werden,
Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 Antitrust L J 707,
713–21 (2007).
43 See, for example, Peter C. Carstensen, Competition Policy and the Control of Buyer
Power 16–37 (Edward Elgar 2017); Marshall Steinbaum and Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust *29–48 (Roosevelt Institute,
Sept 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/AR68-6XKN. See also generally Bork, Antitrust
Paradox (cited in note 5); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Socio-Economic Approach to Antitrust:
Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, and Allocative Efficiency, 49 Akron L Rev 409
(2016); Werden, 74 Antitrust L J 707 (cited in note 42).
44 See, for example, The White House, Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses *5 (May 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/6MH6-D2TH; Naidu, Posner, and Weyl, 132 Harv L Rev at 586–87 (cited
in note 2) (“[M]ergers that trigger scrutiny by reducing labor market competition should
be subject to a ‘worker welfare’ standard.”).
45 See, for example, Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, NonCompete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications *3, 22–23 (Mar 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/HSF2-XAYJ; Marinescu and Hovenkamp, 94 Ind L J at 1057–
61 (cited in note 2); Hemphill and Rose, 127 Yale L J at 2080–2110 (cited in note 37) (proposing a “trading partner welfare” standard). But see Alan Manning, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets 63–66 (Princeton 2003) (arguing that monopsony power reduces both consumer and aggregate welfare).
46 See, for example, Steinbaum and Stucke, Effective Competition Standard at *29
(cited in note 43).
47 See, for example, Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age
135–39 (Columbia Global Reports 2018).
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de-concentrating private power.48 The protection-of-competition
test “might [ ] consider[ ]” consumer welfare harms, but the ultimate concern would be “distortion or suppression of the competitive process.”49
II. PARADOXICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW LABOR ANTITRUST
Worker- and consumer-welfare conflicts can occur as a matter of theory, doctrine, and fact. This Part presents the range of
employers’ procompetitive justifications of, and defenses to, labor
market restraints and the resulting challenges labor antitrust
faces under the consumer welfare standard. These challenges limit
worker protection against monopsonistic and colluding employers.
A. Conflict Between Consumer and Worker Welfare: Economic
Theory
Commentators argue that labor-antitrust enforcement is consistent with the consumer welfare standard under economic theory: when employers exercise their monopsony power by reducing
their purchase of labor inputs, that reduces outputs in product
markets, raising prices to consumers.50 In other words, labormarket restraints that increase monopsony power are bad for
workers and consumers. While this may be true at least sometimes, it is not always true.
First, commentators concede that prices to consumers will
not increase if product markets are competitive or when “reduced
sales . . . will be offset” by new firms’ sales.51 Second, this account
assumes a monopsonist cannot wage discriminate between employees; if it can, it can suppress compensation without reducing
labor inputs by hiring new workers at different pay rates.52 In this
case as well, workers would be harmed but consumers not. And

48

Steinbaum and Stucke, Effective Competition Standard at *29 (cited in note 43).
Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of Competition”
Standard in Practice *9 (Competition Policy International, Apr 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/3G26-63U4.
50 See, for example, Naidu, Posner, and Weyl, 132 Harv L Rev at 559 (cited in note 2).
51 Id at 559 n 93 (emphasis added). See also United States v Syufy Enterprises, 903
F2d 659, 663 (9th Cir 1990) (finding that the defendant exercised monopsony power only
against supplier film distributors, not consumer moviegoers).
52 See Naidu, Posner, and Weyl, 132 Harv L Rev at 558 (cited in note 2) (“[W]aste
created by monopsony . . . depends on the inability of firms to pay [ ] different rates to
different workers. . . . But employers cannot practice wage discrimination very effectively.”); Roger D. Blair and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Monopsony in Law and Economics 41–48
(Cambridge 2010).
49
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wage discrimination is not merely a theoretical concern. While
employers are restrained by having “little information about
workers’ outside options and are deterred by powerful pay fairness norms,” they nevertheless exploit a wide set of tools for expansive wage discrimination schemes: they obviate pay fairness
and information asymmetries by hiring subcontracted, outsourced, and temporary workers.53 And employers have succeeded
in imposing significant technological monitoring to reduce pay and
work law compliance costs.54 The prevalence of wage discrimination
has only increased as workplace fissuring has advanced.55 Finally,
even when reduced labor inputs in fact reduce outputs in product
markets, courts still credit cognizable economic efficiencies.
B. Labor Antitrust’s Paradox: Government Enforcement and
Antitrust Doctrine
Agency and court reliance on the consumer welfare standard
in labor antitrust and monopsony cases reveals limitations on labor antitrust’s ability to effectively regulate employer conduct
that harms workers.
First, the agencies have argued that employers’ labor market
restraints that harm workers may not always harm consumers.
In the franchising context, the DOJ has moved away from per se
challenges to franchisors’ use of no-poaching provisions in franchisee agreements, contending that a more extensive rule-ofreason analysis is required to consider procompetitive benefits of
these restraints on consumers—even a “quick-look” analysis is inappropriate.56 While the DOJ and FTC stated in their Guidance
to Human Resource Professionals that no defenses will be considered in per se wage-fixing and no-poaching cases, defenses may
be considered when reviewing the use of noncompete clauses or
53

Naidu, Posner, and Weyl, 132 Harv L Rev at 558 (cited in note 2).
See generally, for example, David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can be Done to Improve It (Harvard 2014); Alan B.
Krueger, Reflections on Dwindling Worker Bargaining Power (Princeton University and
National Bureau of Economic Research Luncheon Address, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/8N4C-WEEP; Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan, Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards, 63
Indust Labor Rel Rev 287 (2010); Brian Callaci, Vertical Power and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: The Case of Franchising (University of Massachusetts Amherst Working
Paper, Sept 5, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/9QMA-EGFU.
55 See Weil, Fissured Workplace at 87–92 (cited in note 54).
56 See Bryan Koenig, Can No-Poach Class Actions Beat the Rule of Reason? (Law360,
Jan 30, 2019), online at https://www.law360.com/articles/1123789 (visited Sept 4, 2019)
(Perma archive unavailable).
54
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information-sharing.57 And in congressional testimony, FTC
Chair Joseph Simons left open the possibility that, when the FTC
evaluates “potential anticompetitive impacts on labor” in merger
reviews, those impacts would be weighed against merger-specific
efficiencies.58 When asked whether “the ‘consumer welfare’ standard accounts for labor market concerns,” he responded elusively:
“Yes. Antitrust enforcement protects the competitive process,
which benefits consumers, in labor markets as it does for other
markets.”59
Workers also face obstacles when confronting the consumer
welfare standard in the courts. While employers’ horizontal wagefixing is per se unlawful,60 all other labor market restraints are
subject to case-by-case analysis in which courts consider procompetitive or legitimate business justifications.61 While most courts
find that workers can sufficiently allege antitrust injury for wagefixing or no-poaching agreements,62 courts have not rejected employer defenses that alleged restraints benefit consumers under
57 See Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals at *3–4 (cited in
note 40); Questions for Joseph Simons, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 115th Cong, 2d Sess 35 (2018) (Antitrust Enforcement
Hearing) (“[N]arrowly tailored noncompete clauses can benefit competition.”).
58 See Antitrust Enforcement Hearing at 31 (cited in note 57).
59 Id at 24.
60 See, for example, United States v Trenton Potteries Co, 273 US 392, 398 (1927);
United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150, 216 (1940).
61 See, for example, O’Bannon v National Collegiate Athletic Association, 802 F3d
1049, 1069 (9th Cir 2015) (applying rule of reason to NCAA decision not to compensate
student-athletes); Todd v Exxon Corp, 275 F3d 191, 198, 214–15 (2d Cir 2001) (reversing
district court’s dismissal and holding employers’ horizontal conspiracy to exchange salary
information subject to rule of reason); Eichorn v AT&T Corp, 248 F3d 131, 143–44 (3d Cir
2001) (holding no-hire agreements subject to rule of reason); Butler v Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F Supp 3d 786, 797 (SD Ill 2018) (refusing to decide at motion to dismiss
whether franchisees’ no-poaching agreements should be subject to the per se rule, quick
look analysis, or the rule of reason); Deslandes v McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL
3105955, *7–8 (ND Ill) (reviewing franchisee no-poaching agreement under “quick look”
but suggesting later-stage evidence may require rule of reason); In re Animation Workers
Antitrust Litigation, 123 F Supp 3d 1175, 1214 (ND Cal 2015) (denying motion to dismiss
and holding employers’ information-sharing/no-solicitation agreements subject to per se
rule); United States v eBay, Inc, 968 F Supp 2d 1030, 1039–40 (ND Cal 2013) (refusing to
decide on motion to dismiss whether employers’ no-solicitation/no-hire agreements should
be subject to the per se rule, quick look analysis, or the rule of reason); In re High-Tech
Employee Antitrust Litigation, 856 F Supp 2d 1103, 1122 (ND Cal 2012) (refusing to decide
on motion to dismiss whether employers’ “no-cold calling” agreements should be subject to
the per se rule or the rule of reason); Fleischman v Albany Medical Center, 728 F Supp 2d
130, 157–58, 162 (NDNY 2010) (holding wage-fixing agreements subject to the per se rule
but information exchanges subject to the rule of reason). Most cases were resolved before
summary judgment.
62 See, for example, Butler, 331 F Supp 3d at 793–94.
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quick-look or rule-of-reason analyses.63 And in traditional productmarket monopsony cases, consumer welfare benefits “entirely
trump harm to input sellers.”64 Thus, case law on employer restraints suggests workers will face challenges in two categories of
cases: when buyer restraints on inputs (1) harm direct sellers—
workers—but benefit consumers in downstream markets, or (2) benefit direct sellers but harm consumers in downstream markets.
1. Harming workers, benefiting consumers.
Courts and the antitrust agencies have credited consumer
welfare benefits in a range of input restraints by employers (and
other buyers), whether they be horizontal competitors, counterparties in vertical agreements, monopsonists, or merging firms.
While courts have held that procompetitive benefits can outweigh
harms to sellers, this remains an unsettled area of law.
First, courts have recognized consumer benefits from horizontal agreements between employers not governed by the per se
rule—agreements reviewed under the ancillary restraints doctrine—demonstrating reluctance to condemn conduct that clearly
harms workers. For example, in O’Bannon v National Collegiate
Athletic Association,65 defendant NCAA established amateurism
rules that prohibited member universities from compensating
student-athletes beyond grant-in-aid scholarships.66 Studentathletes sued, alleging the rules, by preventing compensation for
use of their name, image, and likeness (NIL), violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act.67 Although the student-athletes won at trial,
the Ninth Circuit reversed in part on the ground that, while the
rule of reason required the NCAA to permit schools to compensate student-athletes up to their cost of attendance, it did not require cash compensation for their NIL untethered to education
expenses.68 The court was persuaded by the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for the amateurism rules—increasing consumer
63 See note 72. Recent case law suggests courts will apply traditional rule-of-reason
burden shifting to labor-antitrust cases. See, for example, O’Bannon, 802 F3d at 1070.
64 Laura Alexander, Monopsony and the Consumer Harm Standard, 95 Georgetown
L J 1611, 1627 (2007). For uncertainty in a prominent labor monopsony case, see Le v
Zuffa, LLC, 216 F Supp 3d 1154, 1163 (D Nev 2016) (“[R]eduction of competition does not
invoke the Sherman Act until it harms consumer welfare.”), quoting Rebel Oil Co v Atlantic Richfield Co, 51 F3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir 1995).
65 802 F3d 1049 (9th Cir 2015).
66 Id at 1054–55.
67 15 USC §§ 1–7.
68 See O’Bannon, 802 F3d at 1079.
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(fan) demand for college sports—and the need to integrate academics and athletics to improve education quality.69 While the
Ninth Circuit found the rules had anticompetitive effects—preventing colleges from competing for recruits through compensation—it concluded that the rules “serve[d] the [ ] procompetitive
purposes identified.”70 The court thus viewed the benefits of the
NCAA’s marketing college sports to downstream consumers as
trumping harms to student-athletes.
Courts and enforcement agencies have also taken employers’
procompetitive justifications seriously in vertical franchise agreements.71 When fast-food franchisors like McDonald’s required
franchisees to include no-poach and noncompete provisions in employment contracts, the DOJ and state attorneys general sued.72
While most cases settled and franchisors agreed to remove the
relevant provisions, the DOJ clearly signaled it would not view
their use as per se unlawful. Instead, in a Statement of Interest
submitted in ongoing litigation, it said no-poach provisions “between labor-market competitors . . . are per se unlawful . . . unless
they are reasonably necessary to a separate, legitimate business
transaction or collaboration between the companies, in which
case the rule of reason applies. The rule of reason also applies to
no-poach agreements between non-competitors.”73 Even a quicklook analysis was not enough. Further, the DOJ stated that
“[m]ost franchisor-franchisee restraints are subject to the rule of
reason” as vertical restraints, and hub-and-spoke franchise conspiracies—in which a franchisor coordinates agreements between
franchisees—were subject to rule-of-reason analysis under the
ancillary restraints doctrine.74
What procompetitive consumer benefits could employers
raise to trump anticompetitive worker harm? Employers’ vertical
agreements, the DOJ argued, while restraining intrabrand competition, may benefit interbrand competition “‘by allowing the
69

See id at 1058–60.
Id at 1073.
71 See, for example, Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955 at *7 (holding per se rule inapplicable because horizontal restraint “ancillary to franchise agreements” and ancillary “nohire agreements . . . can have procompetitive effects”) (emphasis added), citing Eichorn,
248 F3d at 144.
72 See, for example, Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A Burger-Joint
Clause Offers a Clue (NY Times, Sept 27, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/2BXB-2EL5.
73 Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Stigar v Dough
Dough, Inc, No 2:18-cv-00244, *8–9 (ED Wash filed Mar 8, 2019) (Stigar Statement of Interest), available at https://perma.cc/3VYS-56GF (emphasis added).
74 See id at *11, 13.
70
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manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of
his products’ and . . . ‘to compete more effectively against other
manufacturers.’” 75 Further, under ancillary-restraints doctrine,
they may be reasonably necessary to legitimate franchise collaboration.76 Outside employment restraints, traditional antitrust
justifications for exclusive dealing focus on additional efficiencies:
preventing free-riding and hold-up problems; incentivizing promotional efforts, training, and employee assistance; enabling
long-term planning; allocating limited resources; preserving confidentiality; and overcoming branding and reputation imbalances.77 The Government’s position is consistent with allowing nopoach and noncompete provisions if included in joint venture or
merger agreements. Thus, the courts and the DOJ have moved
away from applying the per se rule to anything but naked employer wage-fixing, and their evaluation of defenses credited in
ancillary restraints and vertical agreements cases does not bode
well for labor-antitrust advocates.
Courts have also refused to hold monopsonists liable under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act for harm to upstream sellers without convincing proof of consumer harm. For example, in a foundational monopsony case—Weyerhaeuser Co v Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co78—the Supreme Court found no violation
when a plaintiff did not show a dangerous probability that monopsonist Weyerhaeuser could recoup from alleged predatory bidding on a key input by raising prices downstream.79 Importantly,
the Court viewed predatory bidding as presenting “less of a direct
threat of consumer harm than predatory pricing. . . . [Because it]
could succeed with little or no effect on consumer prices[ ] a predatory bidder does not necessarily rely on raising prices in the output market to recoup its losses.”80 The Court thus implicitly rejected the premise that exercising monopsony power necessarily
harms downstream consumers as well as monopsonist suppliers.

75 Id at *12, 16–17, quoting Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36,
54–55 (1977).
76 See Stigar Statement of Interest at *16 (cited in note 73).
77 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 299–309 (cited in note 5).
78 549 US 312 (2007).
79 See id at 325–26.
80 Id at 324.
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Subsequent monopsony cases also require worker plaintiffs to allege consumer welfare harms to survive a motion to dismiss, even
when worker harm from wage suppression is clearly alleged.81
Finally, courts have prioritized consumer over worker welfare in merger review, and while the agencies have signaled their
commitment to reviewing labor-market effects in future reviews,
they have traditionally viewed reduced labor costs as mergerspecific efficiencies.82 While some argue the consumer welfare
standard is inadequate to prevent anticompetitive harms from
mergers in labor markets, most presume that mergers that increase monopsony power, leading to labor input reduction, will
reduce outputs and harm consumers.83 The case law has not supported that presumption. First, courts have upheld no-poaching
and noncompete agreements executed in mergers when employers showed they were conducive to increasing output, quality control, protecting competitively sensitive information, incentivizing
training and assistance, or preventing free riding.84 In Eichorn v
AT&T Corp,85 the Third Circuit found a no-hire agreement precluding a purchasing target’s employees from seeking employment at AT&T affiliates was not “executed for the improper purpose of restraining trade and the cost of labor” but was intended

81 See, for example, Zuffa, 216 F Supp 3d at 1163. Employers elsewhere deployed
Ohio v American Express Co, 138 S Ct 2274 (2018) (AmEx), as precedent for the proposition
that it is plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate employer market power in both labor and product markets. See In re National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litigation, 2018 WL 4241981, *3 (ND Cal) (rejecting employers’ argument that
AmEx required reevaluation of prior market definition); Defendant Zuffa LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Le v Zuffa LLC, No 2:15-cv-01045, *16 (D Nev filed July 30, 2018)
(citing AmEx in challenge to plaintiffs’ market definition).
82 See, for example, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § V.1.A (1982), archived at https://perma.cc/A3TD-XZE2; Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 3.5
(1984), archived at https://perma.cc/N5ML-8QAJ; Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 (1992), archived at https://perma.cc/
3UE5-G2ZA; Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 4 (1997), archived at https://perma.cc/MXZ6-5UUT; Horizontal Merger
Guidelines at *29–31 (cited in note 11); David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate, and Louis Silvia,
20 Years of Merger Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: an Economic Perspective 47–48
(2002). For the FTC’s new stance, see Antitrust Enforcement Hearing at 31 (cited in note 57).
83 Compare, for example, Abdela and Steinbaum, Labor Market Impact of the Proposed Sprint–T-Mobile Merger at *21 (cited in note 38), with Marinescu and Hovenkamp,
94 Ind L J at 1038–40 (cited in note 2).
84 See, for example, Eichorn, 248 F3d at 146 (approving a no-hire arrangement because its “primary purpose” was “to ensure . . . the purchaser of [a subsidiary] could retain
the skilled services of [its] employees”).
85 248 F3d 131 (3d Cir 2001).
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“to ensure the successful sale” of the merging party, which “required workforce continuity”: “Any restraint . . . was incidental to
the effective sale.”86 The court cited a long history, dating from the
1899 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co v United States87 decision, of
“recogniz[ing] that covenants not to compete are not violations of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act,” characterizing them as “ancillary restraints.”88 Other courts are in accord.89 Finally, while the Merger
Guidelines state that benefits premised on reductions in competition are not cognizable, the FTC has argued in court that lower
input prices passed through to consumers as decreased prices are
procompetitive.90
2. Benefiting workers, harming consumers.
Courts also find that when labor market restraints benefit
workers and not consumers, the consumer welfare standard
trumps and the restraint violates the antitrust laws. Courts have
not only established carve-outs from the application of per se illegality to worker combinations, but they also generously apply the
rule of reason to favor consumers over workers, particularly in
the context of independent contractor organizing and professional
associations.91 For example, in National Society of Professional
Engineers v United States,92 the Supreme Court held that the Society’s amendment to its canon of ethics prohibiting engineers
from submitting competitive bids to ensure competition on quality violated Section 1.93 Even though the petitioners justified the
restraint as a public safety benefit to consumers, the Court held
it unreasonable because it “prevent[ed] [ ] customers from making
price comparisons.”94 Similarly, when a dentists’ association restricted advertisements about the quality of dental services, the
Supreme Court held a more searching rule-of-reason inquiry was
86

Id at 146.
175 US 211 (1899).
88 Eichorn, 248 F3d at 145.
89 See, for example, United States v Empire Gas Corp, 537 F2d 296, 308 (8th Cir
1976); Lektro-Vend Corp v Vendo Corp, 500 F Supp 332, 351 (ND Ill 1980).
90 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at *29–31 (cited in note 11); Statement of the
Federal Trade Commission, In re Caremark Rx Inc/AdvancePCS, File No 031 0239, *2–3
(Feb 11, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/4SWD-GQYQ; Hemphill and Rose, 127 Yale L
J at 2105–09 (cited in note 37).
91 See Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker
Collective Action, 47 Loyola U Chi L J 969, 1030–33 (2016) (collecting cases).
92 435 US 679 (1978).
93 See id at 694–95.
94 Id at 695.
87
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required to determine whether the restriction harmed consumers.95 The Court distinguished professional association’s restraints from business restraints because of “[t]he public service
aspect, and other features of the professions,” but the ultimate
question was whether any harm to competition would “be outweighed by gains to consumer information.”96 Along with precedent subjecting information-sharing agreements to the rule of
reason, this case law would condemn and (at least) chill independent contractors from forming joint ventures to share wage and
benefit information by subjecting such joint ventures to searching
inquiry about consumer harms.97
Workers thus confront roadblocks in labor-antitrust enforcement, in part because antitrust is a double-edged sword that stops
workers from coordinating.98 Workers will have to convince agencies and the courts to adopt a kind of selective enforcement in
cases eliciting procompetitive benefits from labor market restraints: If and when workers suffer from such a restraint but
consumers benefit, labor antitrust should still find employers liable. But when workers benefit and consumers lose from a restraint, labor antitrust should look the other way. At the outer
limit, when workers or independent contractors achieve industrywide agreements for higher pay and wealth-transferring profitsharing arrangements, labor-antitrust enforcement will not benefit them. But there is no defined limit within the literature or
current doctrine for when enforcement should be abandoned.
C. Regulatory Arbitrage in Labor Markets
A second roadblock workers face is employers’ Copperweld
immunity defense from antitrust enforcement, which bars antitrust claims when firms are viewed as members of a single corporate family (the “single-firm defense”).99 Employers can claim immunity even when they are deemed separate “employers” under

95 See California Dental Association v Federal Trade Commission, 526 US 756, 759,
781 (1999).
96 Id at 775, 771 n 10, quoting Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773, 788–89 &
n 17 (1975).
97 For information-sharing agreements and the rule of reason, see, for example,
United States v Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 US 86, 112–13, 143 (1975).
98 See note 81; Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 Cardozo L Rev 1845,
1882–92 (2018).
99 See Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp, 467 US 752, 767–69 (1984).
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labor law, a form of regulatory arbitrage.100 Since the statutory
ban on hiring economists at the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), labor policy and doctrinal developments have evolved
through judges’ common-law elucidations of master-servant control rather than through social-scientific understandings of employers’ power over price.101 Thus, if employers collude or vertically restrain labor-market competition on wages, that has no
impact on agencies’ or courts’ determination of whether the colluding or restraining party counts as a “joint employer” with duties and obligations to collectively bargain under labor law. Employers have used vertical disintegration—outsourcing,
subcontracting, franchising, and other arrangements—to immunize themselves from collective-bargaining obligations, liability,
and compliance costs as “joint employers.” And labor law has prohibited workers from striking and otherwise challenging entities
that do not directly employ them, even if they have economic
power to set their wages and determine their working conditions.
Combined, employers’ immunity—and the corporate structures
and collusion that facilitate it—cost workers in lower pay and increased coordination burdens when they seek to challenge multiemployer or industry-wide wage suppression.
Employers are on the hook for both labor and antitrust violations only if a monopsonist or indirect employer is found to artificially suppress workers’ wages and also meets the joint-employer
requirements under labor law. While the NLRA provides no clear
definition of “employer,” the Board has interpreted the scope of
“employer” based on a “right to control” the means or manner of
an employee’s work and terms of employment. Under the current
Browning-Ferris joint-employer test, “employer” status extends
to those that “share or codetermine those matters governing the
essential terms and conditions of employment” with direct employers and does not require the exercise of direct control; “control
exercised indirectly—such as through an intermediary” may be

100 See, for example, Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67
UCLA L Rev *17–24 (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author). See generally, for example,
Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 L & Contemp Probs 45 (2019).
101 See Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2017 Wis L Rev 1115,
1119–40; Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs.
Adjudication, 64 Emory L J 1469, 1475 n 23 (2015); Catherine L. Fisk and Deborah C.
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L J 2013, 2045–49 (2009).
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enough.102 The NLRB recently issued a proposed rule that would
require putative joint employers to “possess and actually exercise
substantial direct and immediate control over the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment in a manner that is
not limited and routine,” but the rule is not yet final.103 While the
NLRB or the courts may extend joint-employer status to colluding
employers or franchisors that impose no-poaching or noncompete
agreements under the Browning-Ferris test, no case law has explicitly addressed joint-employer status in those settings and existing case law has not been promising. Even when building owners, managers, and maintenance contractors formed a trade
association with subcontracted janitorial firms to strategize
against janitors’ unionization and contributed to a joint strike
fund to help janitorial firms ride out strikes, they were not
deemed “joint employers.”104
Employers can thus evade both labor and antitrust liability
in a number of ways. First, independent contractors, domestic
workers, and agricultural workers are excluded from the NLRA’s
coverage, so any employer restraints in their labor markets not
found to violate the antitrust laws will leave those workers doubly
unprotected. Second, for NLRA-protected workers, the NLRB or
the courts could find that—under either the current BrowningFerris test or the NLRB’s new proposed definition—colluding or
conspiring employers are not joint employers under labor law,
and those employers could also be off the hook under antitrust
law if: (1) they are vindicated through a single-firm defense, or
(2) they are deemed separate firms but their agreement survives
quick-look or rule-of-reason analysis.
On the joint-employer determination, because labor law’s
control test is orthogonal to the elements of Section 1, the NLRB
and the courts do not focus on power over price. Instead, while
determining worker pay, tenure, benefits, and the method of payment are indicia of control, the analysis is broader, considering:
the ultimate authority to hire, fire, discipline, direct work, inspect

102 Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc, 362 NLRB 1599, 1600 (2015). See
also Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc v NLRB, 911 F3d 1195, 1216–22 (DC
Cir 2018).
103 NLRB, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, The Standard for Determining JointEmployer Status, 83 Fed Reg 46681, 46686 (2018).
104 See Service Employees International Union, Local 525, AFL-CIO, and General
Maintenance Services Co, 329 NLRB 638, 638–42 (1999).
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and monitor work, and control scheduling and the number of employees.105 The Board and the courts have rejected joint-employer
claims in a range of settings in the fissured economy, including
when, for example, overseas plaintiffs claimed Wal-Mart was a
joint employer with local employers it contracted with for goods
production, but Wal-Mart only contracted with those factories regarding prices, product quality, and materials used.106 They have
also rejected cost-plus arrangements as automatically rendering
contracting clients “employers” of vendors’ employees.107 Franchisors have been successful in defeating joint-employer claims by
franchisees’ employees, but the new Browning-Ferris test has
rarely been applied due to appeals and the Trump NLRB’s proposed rulemaking.108
The same firms that escape labor-law obligations could rely
on the Copperweld, or single-firm, defense to claim they are unable to “conspire” on labor-market restraints because they are a
single entity. Copperweld is traditionally applied to agreements
between parents and wholly or partially owned subsidiaries, but
it has also “been extended to insulate some coordination between
franchisors and franchisees, on the ground that franchisors exercise control over franchisees and they share common economic
goals.”109 When firms fail in asserting a Copperweld defense, they
may, as discussed above, rely on a range of procompetitive justifications under the rule of reason to evade antitrust liability. Because the types of restraints that dominate the fissured workplace are vertical restraints necessary for indirect employers’
ability to control workers, workers will remain most vulnerable
in these settings.
D. Limitations of New Labor-Antitrust Scholarship
In sum, workers seeking to use antitrust law to challenge employer buyer power in the new era of labor antitrust will face difficulties. At the same time, they will expose themselves to potential antitrust liability if they seek to coordinate to counter that
105 See Browning-Ferris, 362 NLRB at 1611–12; Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 220(2) (1958).
106 See, for example, Doe I v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 572 F3d 677, 683 (9th Cir 2009).
107 See, for example, Pulitzer Publishing Co v NLRB, 618 F2d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir 1980).
108 See Robert Iafolla, Joint Employment Test’s Bark May Be Worse Than Its Bite
(Bloomberg Law, Oct 2, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/87WL-4H6W; Andrew Elmore,
Franchise Regulation for the Fissured Economy, 86 Geo Wash L Rev 907, 932–39 (2018)
(collecting cases).
109 Paul, 67 UCLA L Rev at *45 (cited in note 100).
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power. Each of these challenges stems from the courts’ inevitable
reckoning with the consumer welfare standard. With employer
competitors increasingly aware of crackdowns on naked wagefixing and successfully focusing courts’ attention on downstream
effects by categorizing labor-market restraints as ancillary, the
relevance of the per se rule to labor market restraints will likely
recede further over time.
And current proposals to jettison the consumer welfare
standard in labor antitrust fail to overcome labor antitrust’s paradox. The proposed effective competition standard—while placing
the burden in merger reviews on the merging parties to prove
their transaction will not harm competition and mandating antitrust enforcers to peruse upstream harms110—does not resolve the
question of how to weigh harms to workers and consumers if they
conflict. The “protection of competition” standard fares no better.
While it may draw courts’ and enforcers’ attention to “protecting
the competitive process, as opposed to trying to achieve welfare
outcomes that judges and enforcers are ill-equipped to measure,”
it does not resolve the question of how to handle harms to labor
market competition that do not result in harm to competition
downstream.111 This is particularly tricky in fissured workplaces
where employer wage discrimination may or may not harm the
competitive process—far from “suppress[ing] or even destroy[ing]
competition” in labor markets, fissured employment may make
labor markets more competitive while nevertheless harming
workers.112
These intractable challenges suggest an alternative solution
to protecting workers while maintaining the coherence and integrity of antitrust law: regulatory sharing. Regulatory sharing
would supplement existing labor law by creating an additional
system of substantive presumptions and affirmative defenses
workers can deploy under labor law when employer buyer power
or anticompetitive conduct is demonstrated in antitrust investigations, enforcement actions, or private litigation. Such a solution
is necessary to concentrate antitrust enforcement on consumer
harm from employers’ labor-market restraints while also

110 See Abdela and Steinbaum, Labor Market Impact of the Proposed Sprint–T-Mobile
Merger at *21 (cited in note 38); Steinbaum and Stucke, Effective Competition Standard
at *29–40 (cited in note 43).
111 Wu, After Consumer Welfare at *2 (cited in note 49).
112 Id, quoting Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US 231, 238 (1918).
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strengthening labor-law protections and the role of administrative agencies and expertise in enforcing them. Regulatory sharing
would prevent arbitrage between regulatory regimes that employers exploit to avoid liability and establish a firm role for labor
agencies in merger review.
III. PROPOSAL FOR REGULATORY SHARING
Workers facing labor antitrust’s limitations and regulatory
arbitrage would dramatically benefit from a structural approach
of mutually reinforcing regulatory regimes under labor and antitrust law. Separate but integrated labor-market regulation under
the two regimes is an ideal solution to labor antitrust’s paradox.
Regulatory sharing could also revive critical labor market institutions necessary for sustained checks on employer buyer power
that may reduce costly antitrust enforcement.
A. Consumer Welfare / Worker Welfare
To overcome conflicts between competing welfare standards
and administrability challenges of non-welfare-based antitrust
approaches, this Essay proposes a system of regulatory sharing
in which antitrust agency enforcement and labor-antitrust adjudication would concentrate on consumer welfare effects when
worker and consumer welfare conflict; but antitrust agency investigations, as well as agency and judicial findings, would trigger
substantive presumptions and defenses under labor law as a supplement to existing protections. It also proposes integrating labor
agencies into the antitrust agencies’ merger review.
Separate but joint enforcement has two main advantages.
First, it preserves coherence in both the antitrust and labor regulatory regimes: regulated parties and the courts would be clear
on the standards governing antitrust liability, and those standards would be more administrable and predictable. Second, while
antitrust regulation would concentrate on maximizing output to
benefit consumers when worker and consumer welfare conflict,
labor regulation would step in to achieve the separate but clear
NLRA policy goals: equal bargaining power between employers
and employees to ensure against employee-employer wealth
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transfers and establish countervailing power from the “shop floor”
that strengthens workers’ voices and participation.113
B. Regulatory Sharing Between Antitrust and Labor Law
Regulatory sharing between antitrust and labor law is necessary to ensure against employer arbitrage enabled by antitrust
law’s ambiguous welfare standards and the judiciary’s historical
favoring of consumer welfare over worker welfare. Establishing a
network of labor antitrust triggers for labor rights enforcement,
shared merger enforcement between the antitrust and labor agencies, and substantive law presumptions and affirmative defenses
under labor law generated by labor-antitrust findings avoids the
pitfalls of underenforcement in labor-market regulation.
1. Labor antitrust triggers and shared merger
enforcement.
Labor-antitrust actions should apply a consumer welfare
standard to determine antitrust liability. Yet when a court finds
employers’ conduct beneficial to consumers but harmful to workers in either Section 1 or Section 2 cases, that would trigger a “red
flag” establishing substantive legal presumptions and affirmative
defenses to workers under labor law.114 If plaintiff-enforcers make
a prima facie showing of employers’ unlawful agreements or monopsony power, or power to set wages, this would also trigger a
“red flag.” The red flag would issue before defendants have an opportunity to rebut “by showing . . . no control over wages,” as others propose,115 because labor markets are naturally monopsonistic
and such a rebuttal should not be relevant for labor-law inquiries.
It will likely be difficult and costly for plaintiffs to disaggregate
employers’ market power from search frictions, information
asymmetries, job differentiation, heterogeneous tastes, job-lock,
and other market failures that favor employers’ leverage over

113 On the value of worker voice, see generally, for example, Richard B. Freeman, The
Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits, and Separations,
44 Q J Econ 643 (1980).
114 I develop a proposal for antitrust and labor interagency coordination through
information-sharing and enforcement in Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor Regulation (unpublished manuscript, 2019) (on file with author).
115 Marinescu and Posner, Proposal to Enhance Antitrust Protection at *12 (cited in
note 36).
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workers.116 Thus, while an employer may avoid antitrust liability
by rebutting evidence of its monopsony power, the source of that
power is less relevant in the labor and employment context; if it
exists, workers should be entitled to substantive labor-law presumptions and affirmative defenses.
If employers’ monopsony power is sufficiently alleged in a
Section 2 antitrust case, plaintiff antitrust enforcers would then
need to show anticompetitive conduct: unlawful acquisition or
maintenance of monopsony power (through mergers-to-monopsony,
wage-fixing agreements, no-poaching agreements, or other forms
of exclusionary conduct and foreclosure), attempted monopsonization, or conspiracy to monopsonize. Other scholars suggest that
liability-triggering conduct under antitrust law should extend beyond those traditionally associated with reducing competition to
also include work law violations: the use of broad noncompete
clauses or class-action waivers in employment contracts, unfair
labor practices under the NLRA, independent-contractor misclassification, and restrictive wage transparency policies.117 However,
there are a number of reasons to relegate consideration of this
kind of activity to labor agencies when worker and consumer welfare conflict. First, not all such conduct is harmful to labor-market competition per se, but is instead more indicative of employers’ monopsony power (and, concomitantly, workers’ relative
bargaining leverage) and should be analyzed as such, contributing to the issuance of that first-stage monopsony power “red
flag.” Second, labor agencies have more expertise, data, and remedial mechanisms to assess impacts of employment terms and
deploy shop-floor solutions, most certainly in tandem with antitrust enforcement; inviting antitrust agencies and courts to determine “reasonable terms of employment” without labor agencies’ expertise may not be smart labor policy. Thus, any work-law
violations should be evidence workers can use to justify the applicability of substantive presumptions and defenses in relevant
adjudications under labor law discussed below.
Antitrust and labor agencies could also conduct joint merger
review. Under the 2010 Merger Guidelines, antitrust agencies
must review the impacts of a proposed merger on labor-market
116 See, for example, Berger, Herkenhoff, and Mongey, Labor Market Power at *2
(cited in note 37) (finding substantial employer monopsony power even in unconcentrated
labor markets).
117 See Marinescu and Posner, Proposal to Enhance Antitrust Protection at *14 (cited
in note 36).
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concentration.118 Under a structural approach to labor-market
regulation, if the antitrust agencies identify and categorize postmerger labor-market concentration levels as “moderately” or
“highly concentrated,”119 that data ought to be shared with the
NLRB and the Department of Labor, and their sign-off would be
required.120 Concurrent jurisdiction over merger review is not uncommon. In fact, interagency jurisdiction and/or cooperation on
merger review in the telecommunications, energy, railroad, banking, shipping, airline, and agricultural industries spans the spectrum of more and less aggressive intervention authority by agencies outside the DOJ and FTC.121
Labor agencies could provide critical data on and analysis of
exacerbating factors that affect the significance of given concentration levels when evaluating a merger’s labor-market effects.
The agencies could provide data and analysis of: industry-wide
wage rates in the relevant market, including any changes resulting from prior mergers; the use of noncompete or nonsolicitation
clauses in the industry; union density; the existence of salary
transparency provisions in collective bargaining agreements in
the industry; contractual restrictions on wage transparency; records of enforcement actions in the industry for labor and employment violations (including unfair labor practices, wage-and-hour
violations, violations of health and safety standards, violations
of antidiscrimination law); internal and external labor-market
statistics (how much firms rely on employees or contracted-for labor inputs through subcontracting, temporary agencies, and independent contractors, and assessment of any wage discrimination); history of misclassification actions for misclassifying
employees as independent contractors; and the use of class-action
waivers in employment contracts. This information is critical for
revealing merged employers’ ability to profitably reduce workers’
wages and would more accurately assess the impacts of postmerger concentration.

118

See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at § 12 (cited in note 11).
Id at § 5.3.
120 This regulatory convergence could occur through Memoranda of Understanding.
For more detail on this proposal, see generally Hiba Hafiz, Interagency Merger Review in
Labor Markets, 95 Chi Kent L Rev (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
121 See, for example, Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC §§ 214, 310(d); Federal
Power Act, 16 USC § 824(a)–(b) (1920); ICC Termination Act of 1995, 49 USC §§ 1321–28;
49 CFR § 1180 (Surface Transportation Board railroad merger regulations); Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 12 USC § 1842(a); Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 USC § 1828(c)
(1950); Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, 46 USC § 1701 et seq.
119
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Efficiency defenses would also be independently reviewed:
the antitrust agencies would focus on consumer welfare effects
while the labor agencies would focus on worker welfare effects.
Worker welfare effects would be assessed based on a broader set
of criteria incorporating the expertise of labor economists, behavioral economists, sociologists of work, and human resources and
psychological experts within the labor agencies to better evaluate
how estimated post-merger compensation would match their assessment of productivity-maximizing wages. These experts could
compare how post-merger compensation accords with: (1) internal labor-market wages and life-cycle earnings within a firm;
(2) union premiums within the industry; (3) fairness expectation
effects; and (4) merger-specific workplace realities and productivity effects.122 This analysis would be integrated into evaluating
post-merger effects on workers’ bargaining leverage against their
merged employer.123 Finally, labor agency macroeconomic experts
could estimate the impact of post-merger concentration on labor’s
share of income within the relevant sector.
Labor and antitrust agency approval would tolerate differences in agency standards for evaluating mergers, on whom burdens of proof fall, and proper applicable procedures, much like
concurrent merger review in other jointly regulated industries.
While the DOJ would focus on the merger’s competitive effects,
the labor agencies could apply a broader “public interest” standard. Likewise, while the DOJ would bear the burden of proof for
establishing that a merger should be blocked,124 the merging parties would bear the burden of establishing that the labor agencies
should approve the merger.125 The labor agencies, like the FCC,
would assess whether the proposed merger accords with work law
and agency rules and whether it could result in public interest
harms by substantially frustrating or impairing the objectives or
implementation of work law, including ensuring equal bargaining

122 For robust economic analysis, Congress would need to repeal the current ban on
NLRB economist hiring: 29 USC § 154(a). See Hafiz, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1119–29 (cited in
note 101).
123 For buy-side harms on bargaining leverage, see Hemphill and Rose, 127 Yale L J
at 2093–2105 (cited in note 37).
124 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission v H.J. Heinz Co, 246 F3d 708, 715
(DC Cir 2001).
125 The Communications Act places the burden on FCC merger applicants to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed merger serves the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.” 47 USC § 310(d).
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power between employers and employees. They would also employ a balancing test weighing any public-interest harms of the
merger against potential public-interest benefits.126 Finally, like
the FCC and Federal Energy Regulation Commission, the labor
agencies could condition mergers on appropriate remedies to meet
a public-interest standard, including structural or behavioral
remedies.127
2. Substantive law integration: antitrust and labor law.
While worker welfare cannot be a coherent goal of antitrust
when it conflicts with consumer welfare, Congress has mandated
worker protections under other laws. And labor law should be
deeply informed by labor-antitrust enforcement: to tailor rights
and remedies to the structural realities of labor markets; to deter
unlawful employer monopsony and collusion; and to reinforce the
remedial effects of labor-antitrust enforcement. Thus, as a supplement to existing work-law enforcement, this Section outlines a
system of legal presumptions and affirmative defenses that could
be integrated into work law cases based on labor-antitrust investigations and enforcement. A single system can prevent regulatory arbitrage and limit the creation of buyer power in the first
instance. This is a tremendous benefit over ex post regulation
when considering enforcement costs and the costs of employer
buyer power in labor markets and the larger economy.128 A more
unified approach to labor-market regulation could allow for crosspollination between substantive rules and adapt remedies to coordinate achievement of regulatory goals.
As discussed above, “red flags” punctuating developments in
labor-antitrust investigations and enforcement would trigger
substantive presumptions and affirmative defenses under the
NLRA that would supplement existing labor-law protections.

126 For an FCC analog, see, for example, In the Matter of Applications of AT&T Inc
and DIRECTV, 30 FCC 9131, 9134–35 (2015).
127 See, for example, MPS Merchant Services, Inc v Federal Energy Regulation Commission, 836 F3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir 2016); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act, 61 Fed
Reg 68595, 68610 (1996).
128 See, for example, Carstensen, Competition Policy at 274 (cited in note 43).
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Because organized workers are a countervailing power to monopsonistic employers,129 when a court finds employers either have
monopsony power to artificially suppress wages or have reached
agreements restraining labor-market inputs, workers would be
entitled to these presumptions and defenses. First, when such
findings are made, workers should be entitled to a default rule of
union bargaining,130 or if a union is in place, a Board order to mandate collective bargaining under NLRB v Gissel Packing Co.131 If
workers have formed a union and their employers refuse to bargain in good faith, workers should also be entitled to a Gissel bargaining order and protections to engage in concerted activity under the NLRA.132 Analysis of whether an employer is bargaining
in good faith could be informed by the employer’s buyer power and
social-scientific data on industry-specific, productivity-maximizing
wages. Similarly, analysis of, and remedial options for, whether
employers commit unfair labor practices that infringe workers’
right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike could be informed by monopsony-power determinations and the scope of
worker’s outside options.
Substantive labor-law presumptions and defenses could also
extend to workers’ right to engage in concerted activity against
colluding employers by classifying those employers as joint employers with obligations to collectively bargain with workers.
When employers have monopsony power within labor supply
chains or reach wage-fixing, no-poaching agreements, or noncompete agreements enabling their exercise of buyer power over
workers’ wages, workers should be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of entitlement to a multifirm or sectoral bargaining unit
obligating sectoral bargaining. In such cases, bargaining unit
definitions should expand to encompass employers with buyer
power to the extent workers’ concerted activity against a single
employer would be ineffective. Because joint ownership among

129 See Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman, and Hyunseob Kim, Strong Employers
and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages? *4 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 24307, Feb 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/24TD-3EVD.
130 For establishing a union default rule, see Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94
Colum L Rev 753, 932–33 (1994). See also generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee
Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 Harv L Rev 655 (2010).
131 395 US 575, 610–16 (1969).
132 29 USC §§ 157, 158(a)(5), 158(d).
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employers offers deeper pockets to maintain insurmountable leverage over workers, making it nearly impossible for workers to
successfully engage in concerted activity, the same presumption
should apply to ensure restoration of equal bargaining power.133
Further, NLRA-protected workers should be entitled to affirmative defenses for engaging in self-help and concerted activity that
is currently prohibited, highly regulated, or subject to steep penalties, including secondary boycotts and strikes against monopsonistic or collusive employers. Additionally, employer buyer power
should be integrated into the NLRB’s analysis of whether to classify independent contractors as employees. To the extent buyer
power is shown, independent contractors should be eligible for a
rebuttable presumption of immunity from antitrust liability under
the labor exemption to the antitrust laws to the extent they coordinate to demand higher wages and better working conditions.134
CONCLUSION
The critical turn in current antitrust policy and scholarship
toward the problem of labor-market concentration, the natural
asymmetries of power between employers and employees, and the
broader wealth transfer and inequality effects of lax enforcement
are motivated not only by the failures of the Chicago School’s past
assumptions, but also by a systemic collapse of labor and employment regulation more broadly. Sustainable solutions to the inefficiencies that pervade labor markets, and the democratic and political economy effects of enfeebled labor-market institutions and
worker protections, ought to be one and the same. Integrating labor antitrust into labor-law enforcement is a crucial supplement
to both its protections and its administrative deployment, offering
a key intervention in the right direction.

133 On horizontal shareholding, see generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isabel
Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J Fin 1513 (2018); Fiona Scott
Morton and Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 Yale
L J 2026 (2018). For anecdotal evidence of horizontal shareholding impacting union decisions to strike, see Suresh Naidu (@snaidunl), (Twitter, June 16, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/TF5U-W262.
134 Without the exemption, independent contractors are subject to treble damages for
concerted refusal to deal with their “employer.” See generally, for example, Sanjukta M.
Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38
Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 233 (2017) (collecting cases).

